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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review along with the respective standards of appellate 
review and supporting authority are set forth in Appellant's October 19, 2006 Docketing 
Statement. The issues were preserved in the trial court record at: 2160-2164; 2168-2172; 
2365-2379; 2387-2390; 2490-2530; 2702-2749; 2829-2840; 2842-2843; 2872-2902; 
2935-2938; 2947-2950; 2953-2977; 2985-2987; 3062-3073; 3079; 3087-3094; 3290-
3312; 3317-3318; 3347 at pp. 313-1319, 1379-1385, 1396; R. 3348 at pp. 1604-1619, 
1673-1677, 1680-1684, 1687-1726, 1766-1778; 3349 at pp. 1155-1192, 1195; 3350 at pp. 
1798-1802, 1804-1805, 1845, 1853-1854, 1886; 3350 at pp. 2028-2029, 2057-2060. See 
Attachment 1 for preservation by issue. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
1. Rule 56(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the vrurt, 
. . shall . . . specifyf] the facts that appear without substantial controversy Upon the 
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
2. Rule 1004, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents. 
The original is not required, and other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless 
the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or 
(2) . . . . 
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(3) Original in possession of opponent. At the time the original was under the 
control of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the 
pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the 
hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the hearing;.. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint (R. 13) and defendant filed the Answer and 
Counterclaim (R. 29). Defendant filed the First Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 
209) and plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (R. 697). Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1071). The Ruling on plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. 2379) includes 47 numbered paragraphs in the "Undisputed 
Facts" section. The Partial Summary Judgment (R. 2390) includes only 12 numbered 
paragraphs in the "Undisputed Findings of Facts" section. R. 2389. 
An 8-day bench trial was held over a five-month period and resulted in a Ruling 
(R. 2843) of judgment for plaintiff: (i) of $5,841.57 [$7,293.00 less $1,451.43 relating to 
defendant's final paycheck] for the Hamlet Homes check; (ii) of $2,148.00 for the rental 
of defendant's generator; (iii) of $7,517.59 for conversion of plaintiff s property. The 
Ruling also stated that: "There being no statutory or contractual bases for an award of 
attorney fees, both parties are obligated for their own attorney's fees and costs incurred 
by them in the matter." (R. 2828). 
Contrary to the Ruling, plaintiff filed a Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees 
(R. 2846) and the trial court reversed itself, stating that: "Although the Court's Ruling 
[Re: Plaintiff Complaint and Defendant's Counterclaim (R. 2843)] did not provide for an 
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award of attorney's fees, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Plaintiff is indeed entitled to attorney's fees under paragraph 9 of the 
[purchase/employment] Agreement [plaintiffs Exhibit 5] between the parties and under 
U.C.A. Section 78-27-56. Given the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of punitive damages." (R. 2929). An evidentiary 
hearing on the amount of attorney's fees, costs, and punitive damages to be awarded was 
held. R. 3353. A Supplemental Judgment (R. 3336) was entered awarding plaintiff: (i) 
attorney's fees of $164,461.25 together with prejudgment interest; (ii) punitive damages 
of $34,000.00; and (Hi) cost of $5,892.52. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 3342) 
in conjunction with this appeal. 
Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
The purchase/employment agreement contains the following paragraph 7.4 
unconscionable forfeiture provision: "If the employment of Graham is terminated for any 
reason, he will immediately forfeit any unpaid portion of the remaining contingent 
deferred purchase price specified in Paragraph 2.2 above, plus he will no longer be 
entitled to any continuing salary, allowances, and bonuses." 
On March 20, 2001 (R. 3347 at p. 1398, line 6 through 1402, line 3) a lumber 
inventory was taken by Steve Hawkes. He only inventoried raw lumber. No finished 
wall panels, cut lumber, or any other in-process materials were inventoried to be included 
in the sale, although there were several stacks of wall panels at the wall panel plant on 
March 20,200L R. 3347 at p. 1399, lines 8 through 17. According to defendant's 
testimony (R. 3350 at p. 1805, line 11 through 1806, line 18) he and Steve Hawkes 
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determined that all wall panels manufactured before April 1, 2001 would not be part of 
the sale, and according to Steve Hawkes' testimony (R. 3347 at p. 1431, line 9 through p. 
1432, line 12) all wall panels which were not included as part of the sale could be sold by 
defendant for his own account. 
Plaintiff did not entirely take over operation of the wall panel plant until April 1, 
200L R. 2377 at para. 17. On April 1,2001 plaintiff assumed all of defendant's wall 
panel plant lease obligations and began paying rent to the landlord for the wall panel 
plant. Defendant's Exhibit 174. The wall panel plant continued to operate as normal 
between March 19, 2001 and April 1, 2001. R. 2377 at para. 18. Accordingly, plaintiff 
continued to buy wall panels from defendant during this time before April 1, 2001 (as late 
as March 23, 2001 for resale to Reliance Homes Ensign Park Lot 117- defendant's 
Exhibit 196) as did Hamlet Homes. Wall panels manufactured for Hamlet Homes before 
April 1, 2001 include (R. 3350 at p. 1798, line 9 through p. 1845, line 25) the following: 
(i) Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22; (ii) Muirfield Lot 443; (iii) Glen Eagles Lots 109 and 
114; and (iv) Shetland Meadows Lots 36, 70, and 82. The wall panels for Kelvin Grove 
Lots 20 and 22 were manufactured by Dave Kerlin (R. 3349 at p. 1085, line 23 through p. 
1088, line 4) while defendant was vacationing in Disneyland through March 19, 2001 (R. 
3348 at p. 1752, line 7 through p. 1757, line 24; Defendant's Exhibits 195 and 228). 
After visiting the wall panel plant Bill Quinn of International Profit Associates 
("IPA") recommended to Dan Burton and Steve Hawkes that defendant be terminated. 
R. 3343 at p. 449, line 13 through p. 454, line 14. On August 8, 2001IPA formalized 
(plaintiffs Exhibit 62) its recommendation that defendant be terminated to avoid paying 
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him his salary, guaranteed quarterly bonuses, and the Contingent Deferred Purchase 
Price. 
During August 2001 plaintiff investigated various ways of having IPA's 
recommended termination of defendant appear to be "for cause", including claiming that 
defendant: (i) embezzled a $7,293 check (which Hamlet Homes paid him for the wall 
panels for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22); (ii) caused a $7,000 inventory shortage; and 
(iii) obtained various unauthorized expense reimbursements. R. 155 at para. 11. 
Plaintiffs $7,293 Hamlet Homes Check claim: Plaintiffs claimed ownership of 
the $7,293 Hamlet Homes check is based incorrectly on the related wall panels being 
manufactured after plaintiff purchased defendant's wall panel business and took over 
operation of defendant's wall panel plant. Plaintiffs witnesses Michael Tomer, Dan 
Burton, and Klay Clawson all testified that they did not know when these wall panels 
were manufactured. R. 3343 at p. 325; R. 3347 at p. 1377; Klay Clawson Deposition at 
pp. 262-264. Dave Kerlin (who supervised the actual manufacture of these wall panels) 
testified that although he couldn't remember the specific dates that these wall panels were 
manufactured, he did remember that they were manufactured under his supervision whil; 
defendant was vacationing at Disneyland. R. 3349 at pp. 1085-1087; R. 3349 at p. 1104. 
The evidence establishes that defendant vacationed in Disneyland through March 19, 
2001. R. 3348 at pp. 1752 - 1757; Defendant's Exhibits 195 and 228. Dave Kerlin also 
testified that "These same panels set outside the rolled up doors at the shop for at least a 
month before being delivered." R. 3349 at pp. 1087-1088. 
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The circumstantial evidence presented and relied upon by plaintiff (much of which 
is summarized, somewhat incorrectly, in plaintiffs Exhibit 72) for the purpose of 
attempting to move the date for the manufacture of these wall panels forward past the 
plaintiffs claimed takeover of the wall plant incorrectly presupposed that these wall had 
not been manufactured before being formally ordered. Defendant testified that while he 
was vacationing in Disneyland Dave Kerlin was having significant problems with the 
Weir residence and as a result defendant had Dave Kerlin manufacture these wall panels 
' to keep the guys busy back at the shop". R. 3350 at p. 1812. Dan Burton, Klay 
Clawson, Dave Goodsell and defendant all testified to this practice that defendant would 
manufacture wall before they were ordered in order to fill production time. R. 3349, at p. 
1259; Klay Clawson Deposition at p. 253, lines 1 through 7; R. 3350, pp. 1050-1051; R. 
3348, pp. 1759 - 1760. Defendant's Exhibits 221 and 222 provide documentary evidence 
of this practice. 
Plaintiffs $2,148 Generator Rental claim: The renting of defendant's generator 
was done openly to benefit plaintiff by providing power for plaintiffs framers on 
otherwise powerless jobsites. Plaintiff collected from its customer the $2,148 generator 
rental fee in question and plaintiff opted not to have such $2,148 repaid. 
Plaintiff routinely passed on to its customers a generator rental fee where plaintiff 
arranged for the required power at job sites. Shane Smith testified that the $2,148 
generator rental fee in question was included in plaintiffs $53,793 proposal which he 
signed (after defendant's August 28, 2001 termination) on September 4,2001 and was 
invoiced to plaintiffs customer on September 25,2001. R. 3343 at p. 959, lines 8 
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through p. 960, line 9; R. 3343 at p. 951, line 6 through p. 952, line 10; Defendant's 
Exhibit 159A. Jason Current testified that although he offered to repay the $2,148 for the 
generator rental fee, plaintiff has never taken him up on such offer. R. 3343 at p. 429, 
lines 5 through 22. 
Plaintiffs $7,517.59 Conversion of Personal Property claim: Plaintiffs argument 
that it purchased all tangible personal property used and/or located at the wall panel plant, 
whether or not "shown on a separate asset schedule", is in direct conflict with the 
purchase/employment agreement and the testimonies of Dan Burton, Steve Hawkes, Bob 
Burton, and defendant. Dan Burton testified that at the August 28, 2001 termination 
meeting he told defendant to immediately remove all of defendant's equipment from the 
wall panel plant. R. 3347 at p. 1372, lines 5 through 14. Dan Burton's notes confirm 
defendant's agreement to remove his equipment as directed by Dan Burton. Defendant's 
Exhibit 143; Plaintiffs Exhibit 38. Steve Hawkes testified that the following items 
which were not included on the "separate asset schedule" were not purchased, paid tor, or 
expected to be kept by plaintiff: "Some gooseneck trailers, a pickup truck, a panel van, 
one of the two forklifts, a PC computer . . . golf clubs" - "several items like that". 
R3347 at 1401, line 14 through 1402, line 7. Steve Hawkes also testified that defendant 
"specifically excluded some personal items", including: "golf clubs . . . personal 
computer . . . two or three gooseneck trailers . . . Ford pick-up truck . . . some other 
equipment... a job van". R. 3343 at p. 436, line 23 through p. 437, line 15. Bob Burton 
testified that his handwritten reference to "[defendant's] truck and equipment" 
(defendant's Exhibit 173) relates to items to which "there was an understanding among 
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someone to exclude" and that such understanding was accepted by plaintiff as evidenced 
by plaintiffs April 25, 2001 Lease (defendant's Exhibit 181) of defendant's pick up truck 
and two gooseneck trailers. R. 3347 at p. 1481, line 13 through p. 1483, line 13. 
Defendant testified that everything to be purchased was to be included on the separate 
asset list of the purchase/employment agreement and that "if property was not on the 
asset list it was [defendant's]". R 3350, p. 1902, line 19 through p. 1903, line 11. 
Plaintiffs $34,000 Punitive Damages claim: As set forth in plaintiffs Trial Brief 
(R. 2663: "[plaintiff] is entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages for 
[defendant's] fraud") and opening statement (R. 3344 at p. 41, lines 5 and 6: "we would 
also seek punitive damages for fraud"), plaintiffs only claim for punitive damages relates 
to the fraud claim for which plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. R. 3346 at p. 
843, line 17 through p. 845, line 19; R. 2840. Additionally, the evidence does not support 
the Court's finding (R. 2959) that "[defendant] acted fraudulently, willfully, maliciously 
and with the intent to damage [plaintiff] or in reckless disregard for [plaintiffs] rights." 
To the contrary, defendant testified that he used his best efforts to ensure the success of 
plaintiffs wall panel business during and after his employment, including "during the 
Nauvoo job, right after [plaintiff] fired [defendant, he] went down to the shop several 
evenings to help Klay Clawson ensure that the Nauvoo project was going to be a success" 
R. 3348 at p. 1744, line 17 through p. 1745, line 22. Klay Clawson testified that "It was 
surprising [that defendant was still willing to help on the Nauvoo project even after being 
terminated by plaintiff] in the sense that he had been let go and he was still willing to 
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help out if we needed." Klay Clawson Deposition at p. 123, line 11 through p. 125, line 
3. 
Plaintiffs $164,461.25 Attorney's Fees claim: As stated in plaintiffs opening 
statement "There is not an attorney's fee clause" (R. 3344 at p. 38, line 5) and "As to 
attorney's fees, those would be in the Court's discretion, if the Court determines that the 
defense of the plaintiffs claims have been in bad faith" (R. 3344 at p. 41, lines 6 through 
9). Paragraph 9 of the purchase/employment agreement provides indemnity protection 
from third-party claims, and, as stated in plaintiffs opening statement, "is not an 
attorney's fee clause". 
Plaintiffs $5,892.52 Taxable Costs claim: Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements (R. 2985-2987) was served on defendant before, rather than after, a 
judgment from which an appeal lies and therefore does not meet the mandatory cost-
claiming requirements of Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant's $1/749.56 Final Paycheck claim: Rather than pay Plaintiff his last 
paycheck (which shows $1,749.56 of gross pay for work through his August 28,2001 
termination date) plaintiff has improperly retained same and applied it to amounts 
plaintiff claims are owed by defendant. Defendant's Exhibit 43. 
Defendant's $9,619.57 Accrued Bonus claim: Plaintiff refuses to pay various 
amounts due to defendant under the purchase/employment agreement based on 
paragraphs 7.1 ("[defendant] is an employee at wil l . . . .") and 7.4 ("If the employment 
of [defendant] is terminated for any reason, he will immediately forfeit any unpaid 
portion of the contingent deferred purchase price . . . , plus he will no longer be entitled to 
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any continuing salary, allowances and bonuses.") Such refusal in improper since: (i) 
paragraph 7.4 is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable; (ii) plaintiffs termination 
of defendant in order to avoid paying these amounts is a violation of plaintiff s duty of 
good faith and fair dealing; and (iii) the paragraph 7.1 "at will" provisions do not apply 
where, as here, significant consideration of defendant's business (in addition to agreeing 
to be employed by plaintiff) has been provided by defendant, 
Steve Hawkes testified that "[defendant] brought an up and running existing 
business with established clientele, expertise, equipment where it made it that we could 
immediately produce walls". R. 3349 at p. 1406, lines 2 through 7. Defendant testified 
that "[plaintiff got a functioning wall panel business that was growing rapidly. [Plaintiff] 
got know how to run a successful wall panel plant." R. 3348 at p. 1729, lines 16 through 
21. Defendant testified at length (R. 3348 at p. 1729, line 16 through p. 1742, line 14) as 
to the business and related know how that was transferred to plaintiff in connection with 
the purchase of defendant's wall panel business. 
In regard to defendant's value to plaintiff as an employee, Dan Burton testified 
that he never had any complaints at all about defendant's performance. R. 3347 at p. 
1383, lines 21 through 23. Steve Hawkes testified that while defendant was employed by 
plaintiff as manager "for the most part things seemed to be running pretty well at the wall 
panel plant". R. 3347 at p. 1408, lines 7 through 11. Jeff Burton testified that he gave 
defendant "an A-plus as far as his production ability". R. 3346 at p. 903, lines 15 through 
20. 
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Dan Burton testified that if plaintiff did not contend that defendant was fired for 
cause, plaintiff would have paid this accrued bonus (R. 3347 at p. 1311, line 25 through 
p. 1312, line 10). 
Defendant's $255,260.27 Premium Compensation claim: The $70,000 excess 
portion of defendant's promised $120,000 per year compensation has been calculated 
(through April 20, 2005) to be $255,260.27. Defendant testified that he anticipated that 
"if I used my best efforts to run the panel plant that I would be treated and dealt with 
fairly, and that I would find [plaintiffs business] is a place that I could profitably retire 
from". R. 3350 at p. 1919, line 24 through p. 1921, line 14. In response to "Now when 
you entered the agreement, how long did you expect [defendant] to work for [plaintiff]?" 
Dan Burton testified "I didn't have a predetermined expectation of how long he would 
work for [plaintiff]. We were entering into what we hoped would be a long-term 
relationship." R. 3349 at p. 1388, line 17 through line 21. Plaintiff continues to run the 
wall panel business even today. Monthly wall panel plant revenues have grown 
significantly and steadily from $109, 323.91 (defendant's Exhibit 118) in April 2001 (the 
first month plaintiff owned the wall panel plant) to $198,748.53 (defendant's Exhibit 
122) in August 2001 (the month defendant was terminated) to $343,261.30 in December 
2003 (the last month evidence of monthly revenues were presented at trial). Steve 
Hawkes testified that plaintiff continued to expand the capacity of the wall panel business 
from two lines to four lines after defendant was terminated. R. 3347 at p. 1404, line 5 
through p. 1405, line 8. Dan Burton testified that plaintiff has relocated the wall panel 
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plant twice, with the most recent relocation in 2003 providing the benefit of further 
expanded capacity. R. 3349 at p. 1222, line 3 through p. 1223, line 3. 
Defendant's $441399.41 50% of Pretax Profits claim: For the three years (2001 
through 2003) that defendant was to share in 50% of the pretax profits, plaintiff did 
several things which improperly reduced such profits. 
Joann Hall testified to the various components of the $377,041.67 (defendant's 
unreceived Exhibit 215) of inter company allocations contained in defendant's exhibits 
212, 213, and 214 (R. 3348 at p. 1604, line 10 through p. 1619, line 1) confirming that 
these allocations reduced the wall panel plant's profits. 
Joann Hall testified that the inter company marking up of inventory also reduced 
the wall panel plant's profits. R. 3348 at p. 1619, lines 2 through 5. Joann Hall testified 
from defendant's Exhibit 125 that the 2003 $1,581,125.70 cost of components portion of 
the cost of goods was the only inventory item which included inter company markups. R. 
3348 at p. 1599, line 6 through p. 1600, line 8. Defendant's Exhibit 124 shows the 2002 
cost of components portion of the cost of goods sold to be $1,566,611.34. Based on 
Steve Hawkes' testimony of these markups ranging from 10 to 12% (R.3347 at p. 1396, 
lines 4 through 16), the resultant reduction to the wall panel plant's profit before taxes for 
2002 and 2003 would range from between $876,216.08 and $927,315.71. 
Joann Hall testified that she reduced wall panel plant profits through a journal 
entry (defendant's Exhibit 130) that reduced inventory by $42,383.95. R. 3348 at p. 
1565, line 3 through p. 1569, line 4. Although Joann Hall had been questioned many 
months earlier about this entry during her deposition, she still had no explanation for her 
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journal entry description of "WRITE UP SAVE FOR BACK CHARGES", except for her 
statement that: "I didn't know the error - if there was an error or there wasn't an error. I 
wanted to be conservative and back it all out until we had a more accurate number." R. 
3348 at p. 1568, lines 4 through 25. 
Defendant's $15,209.71 Hamlet Homes Jobs claim: Judge Lay cock's Ruling of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Undisputed Facts include the following: "17. 
According to the contract, plaintiff was supposed to take over operation of defendant's 
panelization plant on March 19, 2001. Plaintiff did not entirely take over operation of the 
panelization plant until April 1,2001. 18. The panelization plant continued to operate as 
normal between March 19, 2001 and April 1, 2001. Defendant claims that the jobs 
performed by the panelization plant up until April 1, 2001 were performed for the benefit 
of [defendant's company] AHS. Plaintiff claims that the jobs performed by the plant 
from March 19, 2001 forward were performed for the benefit of plaintiff." R. 2377. 
Although Dan Burton testified that "[plaintiff] would have ceased doing business with 
Advanced Home Systems at the closing of our agreement" (R. 3347 at p. 1392, line 4 
through line 8), defendant's Exhibit 196 shows plaintiff still ordering and receiving wall 
panels from Defendant on March 23, 2001. Defendant testified regarding defendant's 
Exhibit 196 that plaintiff was still buying wall panels from defendant "Because until the 
end of March I was still manufacturing panels for the benefit of Advanced Home 
Systems." R. 3350 at p. 1846, line 1 through p. 1853, line 12. Susan West testified that 
when she first came to the wall panel plant on March 26, 2001 there were some old wall 
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panels, some new wall panels, and some in-process wall panels. R. 3345 at p. 585, line 
16 through p. 586, line 20. 
Plaintiffs counsel effectively disrupted defendant's testimony regarding these jobs 
(see R. 3350 at p. 1798, line 9 through p. 1845, line 25), through: (i) objecting to 
admission of defendant9s unreceived Exhibit 149, even though defendant's unreceived 
Exhibit 149 is the same as the trial exhibit plaintiff identified as plaintiffs unreceived 
Exhibit 54; (ii) misrepresentations; (iii) continual interruptions; and (iv) objections to the 
admission and use of defendant's unreceived Exhibit 230, even though plaintiffs counsel 
made extensive use of, and had admitted, the same type of evidence summaries 
(plaintiffs Exhibits 72 and 73) in the case. Plaintiffs counsel misrepresented to the trial 
court that "He's talking about a white board that's erased daily" (R. 3350 at p. 1800 line 
20 through line 22) in support of his repeated best evidence objection to any reference to 
the white boards which contained a significant amount of the information about the 
various jobs. Klay Clawson testified as follows regarding his use of the white boards: "I 
would check on the status of jobs and jobs that were done and, you know, they had this 
board out there that was kind of the control board of jobs that were pending, jobs that 
were done." Klay Clawson Deposition at p. 71, line 1 through line 10. Susan West 
testified as follows regarding the white boards: "The boards went in order. They would 
go down, and when the board was filled up, it would go to the top of the next board and 
go down. Then when that was filled up it would go to the next board... . There was . . . 
whether it had been delivered, whether it was supposed to be delivered, you know, things 
like that. Just a whole bunch of stuff all the way across for each job." R. 3345 at p. 587, 
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line 20 through p. 588, line 16. Plaintiffs best evidence objections to reference to the 
white boards was continually sustained, even in light of defendant's uncontroverted 
testimony that the white boards were removed between August 28, 2001 and October 28, 
2001 when plaintiff had control of the wall panel plant, the locks were changed, and 
defendant was denied access to the wall panel plant. R. 3350 at p. 1800, line 20 through 
p. 1802, line 12. 
The circumstantial evidence presented and relied upon by plaintiff (much of which 
is summarized, somewhat incorrectly, in plaintiffs Exhibit 73) for the purpose of 
attempting to move the date for the manufacture of these wall panels forward past the 
plaintiffs claimed takeover of the wall plant incorrectly presupposed (among other 
things) that lumber for these walls was ordered before, rather than after, these walls were 
manufactured. Defendant testified (as paraphrased by Judge Howard at R. 3350, p. 1819, 
line 25 through p. 1820, line 3) "that they would use lumber from their own inventory 
and then replenish with their ordered lumber from Anderson [Lumber]. So seemingly 
that invoice from Anderson [Lumber] would refer to this job, but it may not be the actual 
lumber used." 
Defendant's $16,842 Conversion of Equipment claim: As set forth in section 1.1 
of the purchase/employment agreement defendant sold to plaintiff "All assets shown on a 
separate asset schedule". Defendant testified that the items listed on plaintiffs Exhibit 29 
were his, were never included on the asset schedule of the purchase/employment 
agreement, and were never purchased by plaintiff. R. 3350 at p. 1954, line 14 through p. 
1960, line 2. Defendant testified that he also had his attorney Scott Walker talk with 
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plaintiffs attorney in an attempt to retrieve the remaining items of defendant's 
equipment. R. 3350 at p. 1909, line 21 through p. 1910, line 14; Defendant's Exhibit 
169. Defendant testified that he valued these unretrieved items of equipment at 
$16,842.00. R. 3350 at p. 1901, line 15 through p. 1912, line 20; Defendant's Exhibit 
170; Defendant's Exhibit 233. 
Defendant's $40,000 Truck claim: Pursuant to section 7.2 of the 
purchase/employment agreement plaintiff leased a truck for defendant's use. The 
agreement provides that "If [defendant] quits his employment with [plaintiff], he shall 
have no right to continue the use of the truck and must surrender possession of the truck 
to [plaintiff] immediately." Additionally the agreement provides that "If [defendant] is 
fired without just cause, he shall be entitled to keep the truck and [plaintiff] will deliver 
title to the truck to him free and clear of all liens and/or encumbrances." Otherwise the 
agreement is silent as to the disposition of the truck. Dan Burton testified that plaintiff 
instructed the lessor to repossess the truck. R. 3347 at p. 1294, line 25 through p. 1295, 
line 19; Defendant's Exhibit 166. Defendant testified that since he didn't quit, plaintiffs 
repossession of the truck violated his contractual right to the continued use and 
possession of the truck. R. 3350 at p. 1892, line 2 through p. 1893, line 9; Defendant's 
Exhibit 166. Additionally, since defendant's termination was not for just cause plaintiff 
is contractually required to "deliver title to the truck to him free and clear of all liens 
and/or encumbrances". 
Defendant's $41,415.22 Wall Panel Plant Lease Obligations claim: Although Bob 
Burton testified that plaintiff assumed all of defendant's obligations under the lease 
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(defendant's Exhibit 235) of the wall panel plant (R. 3347 at p. 1445, line 1 through p. 
1447, line 18), Scott Walker testified (R. 3346 at p. 1010, line 1 through p. 1015, line 16) 
that plaintiff left the wall panel plant in disrepair. Defendant testified (R. 3350 at p. 
1928, line 24 through p. 1937, line 11) that plaintiffs failure to satisfy these panel plant 
lease obligations caused damage to defendant totaling $41,415.22, which consists of the 
following items: (i) $700 for repair materials (R. 3350 at p. 1935, line 11 through line 
17); (ii) $2,400 in repair labor (R. 3350 at p. 1935, line 11 through line 21); (iii) 
$20,463.48 for the rent defendant paid pending resolution of the suit by the landlord (R. 
3350 at p. 1934, line 16 through line 25); (iv) $1,191.74 for real estate taxes (R. 3350 at 
p. 1935, lines 4 through 6); and (v) $16,660 for the favorable rent benefit still remaining 
on the lease (R. 3350 at p. 1931, line 17 through p. 1932, line 2). Plaintiffs objection to 
defendant's testimony about the rent paid was sustained. 
Defendant's $573,343.27 Attorney's Fees claim: Defendant testified to a 40% 
contingent fee agreement in this matter (R. 3350 at p. 1940, line 4 through line 25; 
Defendant's Exhibit 239) and to additional legal fees (R. 3350 at p. 1932, line 5 through 
p. 1934, line 4; Defendant's Exhibit 236; R. 3350 at p. 1937, line 13 through p. 1940, lint 
3; Defendant's Exhibit 238), which total $573,343.27 through April 20, 2005. 
Defendant's $16J56.64 Taxable Costs claim: Defendant testified to costs through 
April 20, 2005 of $16,756.64 (R. 3350 at p. 1938, line 1 through line 11; Defendant's 
Exhibit 238). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant is the owner of the wall panels sold which resulted in Hamlet Homes 
issuing the $7,293.00 check to him. 
The $2,148.00 payment to Jason Current for the rental of defendant's generator 
resulted from defendant using his best efforts for the benefit of plaintiff s wall panel 
business to insure that the necessary power was available to job. Plaintiff collected 
$2,148.00 from the customer and waived the right to any additional payment when it 
declined Jason Current's offer to return $2,148. 
Plaintiff failed to establish entitlement to the $7,517.59 of personal property in 
question, that defendant interfered with such entitlement, and/or absence of defendant's 
lawful justification. 
Plaintiffs only claim for punitive damages relates to plaintiffs fraud claim which 
was dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case. The evidence does not support 
the trial court's finding that defendant acted fraudulently, willfully, maliciously and with 
the intent to damage plaintiff or in reckless disregard for plaintiffs rights. Additionally, 
any punitive damages over $1,000 would be excessive based on the Crookston factors. 
The purchase/employment agreement contains no attorney's fee clause. The 
evidence does not support the trial court's finding that defendant's claims and defenses in 
this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith. Additionally, plaintiff has 
not presented sufficient evidence to support any amount of attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs claim for costs, which was filed before (rather than after as required) a 
judgment from which an appeal lies, did not meet the mandatory requirements of Rule 
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54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Even if timely, only $160.00 of the $5,892.52 
awarded costs are proper, since plaintiff has provided no evidence as to why any of these 
deposition costs were essential to the development and presentation of plaintiff s case. 
Plaintiff has improperly used $1,451.43 of defendant's $1,749.56 final paycheck 
as an offset to plaintiffs claim to the $7,293.00 Hamlet Homes check. 
Plaintiff improperly relies on the substantively unconscionable forfeiture provision 
included as paragraph 7.4 of the purchase/employment agreement to avoid paying 
defendant the remaining amounts due for his wall panel business. 
The "at-will" provisions are unenforceable where (as here) defendant has provided 
significant consideration (his wall panel business) in addition to agreeing to be employed 
by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing by terminating defendant 
without good cause based on a cost-saving recommendation of International Profit 
Associates. Plaintiff terminated defendant to stop paying him for his wall panel business. 
During the March 19, 2001 through April 1, 2001 transition (described by Judge 
Laycock as the "mutual breach of contract" period) the parties had defendant continue to 
manufacture wall panels for his own account as clearly illustrated by plaintiff still buying 
wall panels from defendant as late as March 23,2001. The net amount still owed for 
such wall panels is $15,209.71. 
Plaintiff purchased only the equipment from defendant that was listed on the Asset 
Schedule of the purchase/employment agreement, but kept additional items which belong 
to defendant and which are valued at $16,842.00. 
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Paragraph 7.2 of the purchase/employment agreement provides that "If 
[defendant] quits his employment with [plaintiff], he shall have no right to continue the 
use of the truck and must surrender possession of the truck to [plaintiff] immediately." 
Since defendant didn't quit, plaintiff had no right to deprive defendant of the agreed-to 
continued use and possession of the $40,000 truck. 
Plaintiff assumed all of defendant's obligations under the lease as of April 1, 2001, 
but failed to satisfy those lease obligations, including (among others) the obligation to 
repair significant damage to the leased premises. As a result defendant has suffered 
significant economic loss totaling $41,415.22. 
Defendant's attorney's fees (of $573,343.27) and costs (of $16,756.64) are 
recoverable as consequential damages as a result of plaintiff s wrongful termination of 
plaintiff. Likewise, defendant's attorney's fees are recoverable pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 78-27-56(1) where (as here) plaintiffs claims and defenses are meritless. 
20 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court's Incorrect Ruling on Plaintiffs Claims 
Plaintiffs $7,293.00 Hamlet Homes check claim: The legal theories plaintiff 
relies on are apparently conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of written contract, breach 
of oral contract and breach of fiduciary duties. 
"Conversion requires 'an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods 
inconsistent with the owner's rights.'" Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1290, footnote 18 (Utah 1993) (citing Allred v. Hinklev, 328, P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958)) 
(emphasis added). In this case the owner of the wall panels sold and the resultant 
$7,293.00 Hamlet Home check was defendant. 
"In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, three elements must be met. 
First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the conferee 
must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be 'the acceptance 
or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.' The 
plaintiff must prove these three elements to sustain a claim for unjust enrichment." 
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580, 582 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). In this case the owner of the wall panels sold and the resultant 
$7,293.00 Hamlet Home check was defendant. 
Pursuant to paragraphs 1.9 and 4.5 of the purchase/employment agreement 
defendant continued running his business as done previously (including producing the 
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wall panels which resulted in his receiving the $7,293.00 Hamlet Home check) up until 
the closing and transfer of the business to plaintiff 
Plaintiffs oral contract breach claim is based on Dan Burton's self-serving and 
controverted statement contained in plaintiffs Exhibit 39 that at the August 28, 2001 
termination meeting "[defendant] acknowledged that he did owe the [$7,293.00] to 
[plaintiff], that he had cashed the check, but that he couldn't pay us right now, but he 
would pay [plaintiff] on Friday, August 31, 2001." Paragraph 10.3 of the 
purchase/employment agreement, however, specifically precludes such oral modification. 
Defendant's fiduciary duties to plaintiff as manager of the wall panel plant did not 
arise (if ever) until defendant was employed by plaintiff as such. Since the wall panels 
which resulted in defendant receiving the $7,293.00 Hamlet Home check were produced 
prior to such employment, defendant owed no such fiduciary duty. 
Plaintiffs $2,148.00 Generator Rental claim: The legal theory plaintiff relies on is 
apparently breach of fiduciary duties. 
Section 13, Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency (1958) describes the 
fiduciary duties of an agent "to act primarily for the benefit" of the principal including 
the following duties: (i) "to account for profits arising out of the employment"; (ii) "not 
to act as, or on account of, an adverse party without the principal's consent"; (iii) "not to 
compete with the principal on his own account or for another in matters relating to the 
subject matter of the agency"; and (iv) "to deal fairly with the principal in all transactions 
between them". 
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Consistent with defendant's duty "to act primarily for the benefit" of plaintiff 
while employed by plaintiff, paragraph 7.3 of the purchase/employment agreement 
requires that "[defendant] shall use his best efforts to insure the success of [plaintiff s] 
Panelization Division". As manager of plaintiff s wall panel plant defendant saw to it 
that power was available on job sites as required for the framers to be able to use 
plaintiffs wall panels. There was nothing secret about the renting of defendant's 
generator. Plaintiff collected from its customer the $2,148 generator rental fee in 
question. Defendant was paid no more than what was collected from plaintiffs customer 
for the rental of defendant's generator. This $2,148 generator rental charge was included 
as a specific line item in the bidding process and was included in the amount invoiced to 
plaintiffs customer. 
Additionally, even if plaintiff had any right for the return of the $2,148 (which it 
did not), plaintiff waived any such right by declining Jason Current's offer to return the 
$2,148 in question. "'A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute waiver there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it.'" Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 72 (Utah 
1998). 
Plaintiffs $7,517.59 Conversion of Personal Property claim: The legal theory 
plaintiff relies on is apparently conversion and (as to "Truck Lease Expense") breach of 
oral contract. 
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"A conversion is an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without 
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and 
possession." Allred v. Hinklev, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). (emphasis added). 
As to conversion, plaintiff has failed to establish plaintiffs entitlement to the 
items in question, that defendant interfered with such entitlement, and/or absence of 
defendant's lawful justification. 
The oral contract is again based on Dan Burton's self-serving and controverted 
statement contained in plaintiffs Exhibit 39 that at the August 28, 2001 termination 
meeting plaintiff "told [defendant] that we would let him drive home, but wanted him to 
turn the truck in . . . [defendant] said he would do this". Paragraph 10.3 of the 
purchase/employment agreement, however, specifically precludes such oral modification. 
The Trial Court's Incorrect Awarding of Punitive Damages, 
Attorney's Fees, and Costs 
Plaintiffs $34,000.00 Punitive Damages award: As set forth in plaintiffs trial 
brief (R. 2663) and opening statement (R. 3344 at p. 41, lines 5 and 6), the only claim for 
punitive damages relates to plaintiffs fraud claim which was dismissed for plaintiffs 
failure to establish a prima facie case for fraud. R. 3346 at p. 843, line 17 through p. 845, 
line 19; R. 2840. As illustrated throughout this brief, the evidence presented at trial does 
not support the trial courf s finding (R. 2959) that "[defendant] acted fraudulently, 
willfully, maliciously and with the intent to damage [plaintiff] or in reckless disregard for 
[plaintiffs] rights." Additionally, any punitive damages award over $1,000 would be 
excessive based on the Crookston factors. R. 3290-3297. 
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Under Utah law the [Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991)] factors "must be considered in assessing the amount of punitives to be awarded". 
Id. at 808. 
Defendant's net worth is $7,000. R. 3353 at p. 139, lines 5 through p. 140, line. 
In VanDvke v. Mountain Coin Distributors, Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah App. 1988), 
where the defendant's conduct was found to be "motivated by vindictiveness and ill 
will", the Utah Court of Appeals reduced the punitive damage award from $37,500 [7% 
of defendant's net worth] to $12,500 [2.3% of defendant's net worth]. 
The nature of alleged misconduct and the facts and circumstances surrounding 
such misconduct which can be summarized as follows were not, as in VanDvke, supra, 
"motivated by vindictiveness and ill will": 
• Defendant cashed a check in the amount of $7,293 which was made out to his 
company Advanced Home Systems for wall panels which were manufactured before 
plaintiff took over the wall panel plant and which Klay Clawson said were 
defendant's and not plaintiffs (see: plaintiffs Exhibit 25; R. 3349 at p. 1083, line 15 
through p. 1088, line 4; R. 3348 at p. 1751, line 20 through p. 1757, line24; 
defendant's Exhibits 195 and 228; R. 3350 at p. 1811, lines 13 through p. 1813, line 
15; and (f) defendant's Exhibit 229 and R. 3348 at p. 1767, lines 16 through p. 1781, 
line 14); 
• Defendant provided power to a jobsite in the form of his generator as requested by a 
customer and for which he was paid $2,148 by plaintiff and for which plaintiff was 
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paid $2,148 by the customer (see: defendant's Exhibit 159 and R. 3346 at p. 958, line 
21 through p. 968, line 19); 
• Defendant kept (until it was repossessed under the direction of plaintiff) a truck which 
defendant had received from plaintiff as an employment signing bonus and which 
defendant's attorney advised him at the time of his termination (and confirmed to 
others subsequently) that he could keep in accordance with the terms of his 
employment agreement with plaintiff (see: R. 3350 at p. 1892, line 7 through p. 1893, 
line 9; and defendant's Exhibit 163A and R. 3346 at p. 999, line 10 through p. 1003, 
line 20); 
• As directed by Dan Burton at the time of his termination, defendant arranged with 
Klay Clawson to pick up equipment he and Klay Clawson identified as belonging to 
defendant and (in the presence of Klay Clawson and with the assistance of 
defendant's attorney) picked up various of the identified equipment items (see: 
defendant's Exhibit 143 and R. 3347 at p. 1372, lines 5 through 14; R. 3350 at p. 
1893, line 10 through p. 1895, line 10; and R. 3350 at p. 1909, lines 21 through 25). 
Defendant's alleged misconduct had no effect on the lives of plaintiff or others: (i) 
there has been no effect on plaintiffs net revenues (R. 3353 at p. 150, lines 9 through 
13); (ii) there has been no personal, economic effect on the owners (R. 3353 at p. 152, 
lines 16 through 19); (iii) there has been no impact on peoples' view of plaintiff s 
honesty or integrity (R. 3353 at p. 154, lines 11 through 21); and (iv) there has been no 
emotional or medical impact on the owners or anyone else at plaintiff (R. 3353 at p. 155, 
line 10 through p. 156, line 6). 
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There is little (if any) probability of future recurrence of defendant's alleged 
misconduct, since: (i) he will not be developing and then selling another business (R. 
3353 at p. 143, lines 12 through 20); (ii) he will not be seeking to manage a division of a 
large company in the future (R. 3353 at p. 143, line 21 through p. 144, line 1 ); (iii) 
plaintiff has stipulated that there is no opportunity for recurrence of defendant's alleged 
misconduct at plaintiffs company (R. 3353 at p. 164, lines 13 through 14); and (iv) 
plaintiff will not recommend defendant for employment (see R. 3353 at p. 165, lines 4 
through 9). 
Defendant has never had any relationship with plaintiff (or any of its owners or 
employees) other than as a customer, a seller of a business, and as an employee. R. 3353 
at p. 168, line 20 through p. 169, line 4. 
The amount of actual damages in this case is $15,507. In Wilson v. Olroyd, 267 
P.2d 759, (Utah 1954), the Supreme Court reduced the punitive damage award from 
$25,000 [50% of the compensatory damages] to $5,000 [10% of the compensatory 
damages]. 
Plaintiffs $164,461.25 Attorney's Fee award: As stated in plaintiffs opening 
statement "There is not an attorney's fee clause" (R. 3344 at p. 38, line 5). Paragraph 9 
of the purchase/employment agreement only provides indemnity protection from third-
party claims. The evidence does not support the trial court's finding (R. 2958) that 
"[defendant's] claims and defenses in this action are without merit and were asserted in 
bad faith." Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to support any amount of an 
award of attorney's fees (R. 3303-3311) and has not allocated amounts between 
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successful and unsuccessful claims as required. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266, 268-70 (Utah 1992); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). 
Plaintiffs invoices which were included as Exhibit A (R. 2988-3061) to plaintiff 
counsel's November 16, 2005 Affidavit (R. 3062-3066) have insufficient detail for 
determining to which issues the claimed fees relate. See R. 3353 at p. 61, line 15 through 
p. 64, line 22; p. 91, lines 16 through 21; p. 111, line 4 through p. 114, line 12; and p. 
117, line 19 through p. 120, line 13. Even where some detail as to what issues were 
being addressed is provided, plaintiffs invoices lump all of each individual's time 
together by day so that it is impossible even then to determine what portion of the hours 
billed that day related to what issues. See R. 3353 at p. 92, line 18 through p. 93, linel6; 
and p. 99, line 19 through p. 100, line 8. Plaintiff has been unable and/or unwilling to 
provide any additional detail beyond the invoices, making it impossible to determine the 
proper allocation of the claimed fees. See R. 3353 at p. 101, lines 7 through 8; and p. 
111, line 4 through p. 114, line 12. 
Under Utah law, the required allocation to issues based on "success" deals with 
interim as well as ultimate success on the issues raised. See Cache County v. Beus, 128 
P.3d 63 (Utah App. 2005) (fees charged for obtaining summary judgment which was later 
reversed were related to an unsuccessful issue and therefore unrecoverable); ProMax 
Development Corporation v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000) (award of attorneys' fees 
for successful appeal did not include fees incurred in pursuing the unsuccessful motion to 
dismiss the appeal). Plaintiff has failed to properly allocate the claimed fees between the 
successful and unsuccessful claims. For example: (i) none of the fees claimed for trial 
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time were allocated to the unsuccessful fraud claim (see R. 3353 at p. 33, lines 13 
through 15); and (ii) none of the fees claimed for trial time were allocated to the 
unsuccessful improper expense reimbursement claim (see R. 3353 at p. 67, line 17 
through p. 68, line 10; and R. 3353 at p. 70, lines 16 through 18). Plaintiff has also failed 
to properly allocate the claimed fees between the successful and unsuccessful motions. 
For example: (i) none of the claimed fees were allocated to plaintiffs unsuccessful 
opposition to defendant's motion to amend his answer and counterclaim (see R. 3353 at 
p. 76, line 21 through p. 78, line 14); and (ii) none of the claimed fees were allocated to 
the unsuccessful portions of plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (see R. 
3353 at p. 38, lines 8 through 17; and p. 78, line 15 through p. 80, line 22). Even for the 
very few (less than 25 of over 1,000) hours plaintiff did allocated to plaintiffs 
unsuccessful claims, plaintiff arbitrarily reduced the claimed fees at a rate of $190 per 
hour, rather than the $200 per hour billed for these hours. See R. 3353 at p. 88, line 20 
through p. 91, line 8. 
Neither the affidavits submitted in support of the attorneys' fees claimed, nor the 
related testimony at the June 29, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing, were sufficiently detailed to 
show the reasonableness of the fees claimed, as required by Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Likewise, although plaintiff claims attorney's fees under section 9 of the 
contract and pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-27-56, plaintiff correlates none of the 
evidence to either of those claimed bases. 
Although defendant requested discovery including "access to supporting 
documents such as attorney time records" [Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 
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268 (Utah 1992)], such request was denied at the December 8, 2005 Scheduling 
Conference based on plaintiff counsel's representation to the trial court that the 
supporting documents would contain no more information than contained on the invoices 
and that the eight individuals who billed time to this matter would remember no more 
than what was recorded on the invoices. See R. 3352 at p. 9, line 6 through p. 24, line 15. 
Rather than carry the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award, 
plaintiff has chosen instead to leave it to the trial court to somehow allocate the time and 
related fees, even though plaintiffs counsel was unable to tell the trial court what hours 
were spent on what issues from his own review of his firm's invoices (which were 
provided as the sole documentary evidence1 in support of the $163,434 of claimed 
attorneys' fees). See R. 3353 at p. 62, line 11 through p. 64, line 22. 
Plaintiffs unquestioning2 authorization to expend $163,434 of attorneys' fees to 
recover $15,507 of the $34,387 claimed by plaintiff at trial in this case is clearly 
unreasonable. "Several practical factors to consider in determining a reasonable attorney 
fee are the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result 
At the June 29, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing defendant objected to the admission of 
plaintiffs counsel's November 16, 2005 Affidavit and the exhibit to same containing 
these invoices as not being the "best evidence", as not being based on personal 
knowledge, and as being biased. Although the trial court overruled the objection, 
plaintiff chose not to submit the Affidavit for admission in the June 29, 2006 Evidentiary 
Hearing. See R. 3353 at p. 21-22, line 11 through p. 22, line 11; and p. 10, line 18 
through p. 14, line 1. 
30 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved." Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah 1989). (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff counsel's testimony in support of his allocation to the unsuccessful issues 
of less than 25 hours [$4,543 of the invoiced amounts] compared to allocation to the 
successful issues of the more than 1,000 hours [$163,434 of the invoiced amounts] was 
self-serving and such allocation in this case is clearly unreasonable. "[TJhe trial judge 
was not necessarily compelled to accept... self-interested testimony whole cloth . . . . " 
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1978). (citations omitted). 
"Undoubtedly, if a witness can be disbelieved entirely because of self-interest, a fortiori, 
he can be disbelieved in part, or his testimony discounted to any reasonable extent." 
Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 357 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1960). 
Plaintiff has had sufficient opportunity to correctly allocate the claimed fees, but 
has failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs claim for attorneys' fees should have been 
denied and no attorneys9 fees should have been awarded to plaintiff. See Jensen v. 
Sawyer, 130 P.3d 325, 349-50 (Utah 2005) (affirming denial of fees where attorney "did 
not give [the court] sufficient evidence to determine how much time he spent on 
compensable claims and because the amount of time he claimed to have spent on 
compensable claims is unreasonable"); Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall 
Company, 26 P.3d 872 (Utah App. 2001) (affirming denial of fees where supporting 
affidavit accompanied by invoices failed to properly allocate claimed fees); A.K.& R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 526 (Utah App. 
2
 See R. 3353 at p 159, lines 3 through 7; and lines 22 through 24. 
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1999) (reversing and remanding where the trial awarded fees while acknowledging that it 
"had difficulty, based on [the] attorney fee affidavit, in separating the amount of time 
involved with [matters subject to a fee award] as opposed to the amount of time spent on 
other matters". "The Utah Supreme Court has required a party seeking attorney fees to 
allocate its request for fees according to its underlying claim."); Commerce Financial v. 
Hucks, 806 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah App. 1990) ("this failure . . . to apportion its fees would 
alone be sufficient basis for the court's denial of [the] request for attorney fees"); Utah 
Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981) (affirming 
denial of attorneys' fees: "Because plaintiff failed in its proof, the court was left without a 
means to determine the portion of plaintiff s fees spent in prosecuting it complaint [where 
an award was available] and the portion spent in defending the counterclaim [where an 
award was unavailable]. Based on the evidence presented, we are not convinced that the 
trial court abused its discretion in [denying attorneys' fees]."). 
Plaintiffs $5,892.52 Costs award: Plaintiffs November 11, 2005 Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements (R. 2985-2987) was served on defendant (R. 2985) before, 
rather than after, a judgment from which an appeal lies and therefore does not meet the 
mandatory requirement of Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to how 
plaintiffs costs must be claimed. 
Judge Howard's Ruling Re: Plaintiffs Cost and Disbursements (R. 3314-3320) 
includes $4,405.10 for copies of deposition transcripts of plaintiff s own 
agents/employees' and $1,120.74 for copies of deposition transcripts of defendant's 
deposition which are not taxable as costs, since plaintiff has not presented any evidence 
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that copies of these transcripts were essential to the development and presentation of 
plaintiffs case. See Young v. State of Utah, 16 P.3d 549, 552-53 (Utah 2000). 
The Trial Court's Incorrect Denial of Defendant's Claims 
Defendant's $1/749.56 Final Paycheck claim: Rather than pay Plaintiff his last 
paycheck (which shows $1,749.56 of gross pay for work through his August 28, 2001 
termination date) plaintiff has improperly retained same and applied $1,451.43 of it to 
amounts plaintiff claims are owed by defendant. Defendant's Exhibit 165. 
Defendant's $9,619.57 Accrued Bonus claim: Plaintiffs refusal to pay various 
amounts due to defendant under the purchase/employment agreement is improper since: 
(i) the paragraph 7.4 forfeiture provision is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable; 
(ii) plaintiffs termination of defendant in order to avoid paying these amounts is a 
violation of plaintiff s duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (iii) such "at will" 
provisions as paragraph 7.1 do not apply where, as here, significant consideration (in 
addition to agreeing to be employed by plaintiff) has been provided by defendant. 
In Resource Mangement Company v. Westin Ranch and Livestock Company Inc, 
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court describes the limited applicability of 
the "general principle" that the courts will not relieve a party from the effects of a bargain 
that the party has made. Unconscionability is described as an "established exception" to 
this general principle. Id. at 1040. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the law on unconscionability as follows: 
"Gross disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can support a 
finding of unconscionability." Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 361 (Utah 1996). "The 
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arguments for and against substantive unconscionability focus on the contents of the 
agreement, examining the relative fairness of the obligations assumed. When 
determining whether a contract is substantively unconscionable, we have considered 
whether its terms are so one sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party or 
whether there exists an overall imbalance by the obligations and rights imposed by the 
bargain. The terms of the contract should be considered according to the mores and 
business practices of the time and place." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the actions taken by 
plaintiff in carrying out the purchase/employment agreement be neither in bad faith nor 
unfair to defendant. An example of such bad faith and unfairness in this case is set forth 
by Judge Laycock where she states that, if the trial court finds that defendant "was 
terminated for the sole purpose of avoiding payment under the contingent deferred 
purchase payment clause of the contract" he "would be entitled to receive payment". R. 
2367. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
as follows: "Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party promises not 
to intentionally or purposefully do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's 
right to receive the fruits of a contract." Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.3d 876, 885 (Utah 
2001). (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Dubois v. Grand Central 872 P.2d 
1073 (Utah App. 1994), the Court addresses the "tension" between situations regarding: 
(i) the potential danger of the covenant of good faith imposing independent rights or 
duties not provided for in the contract; and (ii) the potential danger of the employee being 
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deprived of rights under the contract (other than the employment status itself) based on 
the "at-will" employment status. Id. at 1078-79. 
Utah recognizes common law exceptions to "at-will" employment contracts. 
Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 775 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. 
1989). The "at-will" provisions in the purchase/employment agreement are subject to 
modification and removal from the "at-will" category where, as here, consideration of 
defendant's business (in addition to the services to be rendered as an employee) is 
provided by the employee which benefits the employer. Rose v. Allied Development 
Company, 719 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1986). 
"Broadly speaking, the more leeway a party has under the terms of a contract, the 
more contracting parties may invoke the protections of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in the exercise of that discretion." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 94 
P.3d 193, 198 (Utah 2004). 
A party claiming violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is to be 
given leeway as to the admissibility of evidence to establish such claim: 
. . . although Eggett's evidence of book value might be extrinsic and inadmissible 
to vary the terms of the Shareholder Agreement, it is nevertheless admissible to 
prove Eggett's breach of covenant claim. 
Id. 
In violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case, plaintiff 
intentionally and purposefully: (i) terminated defendant's employment; and (ii) prevented 
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defendant from effectively competing3 with plaintiff- both in order to destroy and/or 
injure defendant's right to receive the fruits of his contract from the sale of defendant's 
wall panel business to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff terminated defendant's employment based on a recommendation from 
International Profit Associates ("IPA"), which was formalized August 8, 2001 
(defendant's Exhibit 138). Steve Hawkes testified (R. 3345 at p. 518, lines 1 through 15) 
of IPA's recommendation to terminate defendant's employment. 
Dan Burton and Steve Hawkes testified (R. 3347 at p. 1383, lines 21 through 23; 
and p. 1408, lines 7 through 11) that they had no complaints about defendant's job 
performance. Jeff Burton testified (R. 3346 at p. 903, lines 15 through 20) that he gave 
defendant "an A-plus as far as his production ability". 
In an affidavit prepared in the course of this litigation, Dan Burton described (R. 
155 at para. 11) his stated three bases for the decision to terminate defendant as follows: 
The only reason I decided to terminate [defendant] Graham was his dishonesty in 
embezzling [the $7,293 Hamlet Homes check] from [plaintiff] Burton Lumber and 
submitting false expense vouchers and his inability to explain the $7,000 inventory 
shortage. 
Plaintiffs purported "investigation" of these three bases make it clear that each is 
trumped up and without merit. As discussed above, the $7,293 Hamlet Homes check was 
Although the parties were unable to agree (R. 3350 at p. 1916, line 14 through p. 1919, 
line 23) on any non-compete provision in the purchase/employment agreement, plaintiff 
unfairly obtained for itself the un-bargained-for benefit and improperly prevented 
defendant from effectively competing after termination of his employment by improperly 
depriving him of his truck, his equipment, his leased panel plant, and his final pay. Also, 
by filing this civil action and having a criminal complaint filed, plaintiff effectively 
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for wall panels manufactured before the closing of the purchase and thus belonged to 
defendant. Dan Burton testified that he had no direct knowledge of when these wall 
panels were manufactured and could not recall ever asking anyone when they were 
manufactured. R. 3347 at p. 1375, line 15 through p. 1379, line 12. All of the expense 
reimbursements in question were for legitimate business expenses. "The preponderance 
of the evidence demonstrates that Defendant timely and properly submitted these 
expenses to plaintiff, and following regular procedures of submission and review, 
Plaintiff approved the expenses." R.2835. At trial Dan Burton directly contradicted his 
affidavit (R. 155 at para. 11) when he provided the following testimony (R. 3347 at p. 
1374, line 12 through p. 1375, line 9) regarding the $7,000 inventory shortage: "The 
inventory shortage did not weigh in on the decision to terminate [defendant] Michael 
Graham." Klay Clawson testified in his April 7, 2003 Deposition (page 144, lines 14 
through 24) that he had no knowledge of whether or not defendant caused the $7,000 
inventory shortage. In fact, the $7,000 inventory shortage was never booked and was 
such a small shrinkage compared to sales that it would have qualified the responsible 
manager for a bonus under plaintiffs Profit Participation Program (defendant's Exhibit 
153). 
The timing and extent of the so-called "investigation" of defendant, which Dan 
Burton directed to be conducted, makes it clear that Dan Burton knew at the time that his 
three stated bases for terminating Michael Graham were trumped up and without merit. 
diverted defendant's time and financial resources, thus improperly preventing him from 
effectively competing with plaintiff. 
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For example, at trial Dan Burton testified (R. 3349 at p. 1224, line 14 through p. 
1247, line 16) as to: (i) his being caught in a lie during his 30(b)(6) deposition testimony 
about whether or not he or anyone other than defendant approved defendant's expense 
reimbursements; and (ii) the fact that he was still approving defendant's expense 
reimbursements at the same time the purported "investigation" was taking place. 
As another example, the formal IP A Recommendation (defendant's Exhibit 138), 
which is dated August 8, 2001, states that "Klay would approach Dave after hours today 
to go over this matter." Klay Clawson, however, testified in his Deposition at page 216 
(lines 12 through 21) that he did not even take the physical inventory until the night of 
August 8, 2001. See physical inventory count dated August 8, 2001 (defendant's Exhibit 
152). The so-called "investigation" was simply a set-up and had nothing to do with the 
decision to terminate defendant's employment and thus improperly prevent him from 
receiving the fruits of his contract with plaintiff- payment as agreed for defendant's wall 
panel business. 
Defendant's $255,260.27 Premium Compensation claim: By terminating 
defendant, plaintiff also violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
intentionally and purposefully depriving defendant of the fruits of his contract - payment 
as agreed for defendant's wall panel business - in the form of the promised annual 
compensation in excess of "fair compensation". Defendant's $120,000 annual 
compensation included a $70,000 per year premium over the "fair compensation" of 
$50,000 per year as determined by plaintiffs expert witness. See defendant's Exhibit 
202 at page 5. 
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Defendant's $441,399.41 50% of Pretax Profits claim: Although defendant was to 
share in 50% of the pretax profits, plaintiff did several things which improperly reduced 
such profits. 
As a result of plaintiff s contract breach, including its violation of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, defendant has suffered substantial economic injury. 
Under Utah law, damages available for a breach of contract may include not only 
general contract damages, but because the goal is to place the aggrieved party in 
the same economic position he would have had if the contract had been performed, 
the party may also seek redress through consequential damages. 
Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, 200 (Utah App. 2003). (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
The appropriate damages in this case are those required to restore defendant to the 
same economic position as if plaintiff had fully performed and defendant would have 
received the full fruits of the purchase/employment agreement. 
In addition to improperly terminating defendant, plaintiff failed to replace him 
with a manager experienced in the manufacture of wall panels. As a direct result in 2002 
Burton Lumber lost $98,240 (defendant's received then unreceived Exhibit 135B) on the 
Mammoth California job, rather than making between $300,000 and $400,000 as 
projected. See: defendant's Exhibit 136 (B06088); and April 3, 2003 Deposition of Klay 
Clawson at page 160, line 7 through page 161, line 5; and at page 231, line 2 through line 
23. 
As a direct result of the loss on the Mammoth, California project and JoAnn Hall's 
related May 30,2002 arbitrary reduction of wall plant inventory by $42,384 (see 
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defendant's Exhibit 130), plaintiff failed to meet its own 2002 projected pretax profit. 
For 2002 plaintiff projected pretax profits of $482,973 (based on a projected gross profit 
margin of 25.69%) for the wall division, but reported instead a pretax loss of $49,391 
(based on a reported gross profit margin of 20.13%). See defendant's Exhibit 124 
(B06128)). 
Had plaintiff replaced defendant with a manager experienced in the manufacture 
of wall panels and thus competent to succeed on the Mammoth California project, and 
had JoAnn Hall not have arbitrarily reduced inventory, plaintiff would have surpassed 
(defendant's unreceived Exhibit 211) its own 2002 projected pretax profits of $482,973: 
Reported 2002 Pretax Loss ($ 49,391) 
Plus: 
Reversal of Arbitrary 5/30/02 Inventory Reduction $ 42,384 
Reversal of Mammoth California Back Charges $ 98,240 
Projected Gross Profit on Mammoth California $400,000 
Adjusted 2002 Pretax Profit $491,233 
In 2003 plaintiff deprived defendant of the fruits of his contract - payment as 
agreed for defendant's wall panel business - in the form of 50% of the 2003 pretax 
profits by (among other things) failing to meet its 2003 projected pretax profits of 
$691,553 (based on a projected gross profit margin of 26.50%). See defendant's Exhibit 
128 (B06518 and B06519). Instead, defendant reported a pretax loss of $227,571 (based 
on a reported gross profit margin of 14.34%). 
JoAnn Hall testified (R. 3348 at p. 1604, line 10 through p. 1619, line 1) as to 
2001,2002, and 2003 wall panel plant pre-tax profits being reduced by $377,041.67 
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(defendant's unreceived Exhibit 215) as a result of inter company allocations of corporate 
expenses to the wall panel plant. She also testified (R. 3348 at p. 1619, lines 2-5) that 
inter company marking up of inventory reduced such pre-tax profits. Steve Hawkes 
testified (R. 3347 at p. 1396, lines 4 through 16) that such markups to the wall panel plant 
ranged from 10-12%. JoAnn Hall testified (R. 3348 at p. 1599, line 6 through p. 1600, 
line 8) that the markup was on the item described in the financial statements as cost of 
component. Accordingly, the incremental pretax profit reduction for 2002 and 2003 
alone from marking up cost of components, which were $1,566,611.34 in 2002 
(defendant's Exhibit 124 (B06129)) and $1,581,125.70 in 2003 (defendant's Exhibit 125 
(B06241)), ranged $314,773.70 to $377,728.45. 
Defendant's $15,209.71 Hamlet Homes Jobs claim: Judge Lay cock's Ruling of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Undisputed Facts include (R. 2377) the following: 
"17. According to the contract, plaintiff was supposed to take over operation of 
defendant's panelization plant on March 19, 2001. Plaintiff did not entirely take over 
operation of the panelization plant until April 1, 2001. 18. The panelization plant 
continued to operate as normal between March 19, 2001 and April 1, 2001. Defendant 
claims that the jobs performed by the panelization plant up until April 1, 2001 were 
performed for the benefit of [defendant's company] AHS. Plaintiff claims that the jobs 
performed by the plant from March 19,2001 forward were performed for the benefit of 
plaintiff." R. 2377. 
Defendant testified (R. 3350 at p. 1848, line 14 through p. 1849, line 1) that "until 
the end of March [2001] I was producing walls for the benefit of [defendant's company] 
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Advanced Home Systems". Steve Hawkes testified (R. 3347 at p. 1399, lines 8 through 
17) that only uncut, dimension lumber was inventoried at the time of the purchase of 
defendant's wall panel plant and that no in-process or finished wall panels were included 
in the purchase. 
In her January 12, 2004 Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Laycock 
describes (R. 2372) as a "mutual breach of contract" this transition period when "The 
parties agree that plaintiff did not take control of [defendant's company] AHS until April 
1, 2001, but the contract states that AHS should cease to exist as an independent business 
after the closing date . . . . " The fact that defendant was to continue to manufacture and 
sell wall panels for his own account during this transition "mutual breach of contract" 
period is clearly illustrated by defendant's Exhibit 196 which shows that plaintiff was 
itself still buying wall panels from defendant as late as March 23, 2001. 
In addition to wall panels which gave rise to the $7,293.00 Hamlet Home check, 
there are six Hamlet Homes jobs for which wall panels were manufactured for the 
account of defendant before plaintiff took over the wall panel plant on April 1, 2001, but 
for which plaintiff received payment (see plaintiffs Exhibit 73). These six jobs each had 
buyer selection dates prior to April 1, 2001. See plaintiffs Exhibit 73. 
Additional evidence of the manufacture of these wall panels prior to plaintiff 
taking over operation of the wall panel plant on April 1, 2001 is found throughout the 
record. See plaintiffs Exhibits 54 (unreceived), 55, 57, 59, 65, 69, 70, 71, 73; 
defendant's Exhibits 126, 149 (unreceived), 187, 193 (unreceived), 231 (unreceived), 
232; and defendant's testimony (R. 3350 at p. 1798, line 9 through p. 1803, line 13). 
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Defendant's $16,842.00 Conversion of Equipment claim: As set forth in section 
1.1 of the purchase/employment agreement defendant sold to plaintiff purchased 
equipment as listed on the Asset Schedule, including specifically: "All assets shown on a 
separate asset schedule". 
Plaintiff purchased equipment from defendant as listed on the Asset Schedule 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 (B00479)) for an agreed price of $54,175.00. Although plaintiff had 
neither purchased nor paid for 55 other items of equipment (see defendant's Exhibit 170) 
that were at the wall panel plant at the time of defendant's termination, plaintiff kept all 
but five of such 55 equipment items. Defendant has estimated the value of the equipment 
items which belong to defendant, but have been retained by plaintiff, to be $16,842.00. 
See plaintiffs Exhibit 63(14). 
Steve Hawkes testified (R. 3343 at p. 436, line 23 through p. 437, line 15; R. 3347 
at p. 1401, line 14 through p. 1402, line 7) that several items of defendant's equipment 
which were not included on the Asset Schedule were not purchased, paid for, or expected 
to be kept by plaintiff. Dan Burton testified (R. 3347 at p. 1372, lines 5 through 14) that 
he told defendant at the August 28, 2001 termination meeting to remove all of 
defendant's equipment from the wall panel plant. Bob Burton testified (R. 3347 at p. 
1481, line 13 through p. 1483, line 13) that "there was an understanding among someone 
to exclude" defendant's "truck and equipment" from the purchase. In fact, on April 25, 
2001 plaintiff entered into a written lease (defendant's Exhibit 181) with defendant to 
lease some of defendant's equipment which was not included in the Asset Schedule. 
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Defendant's $40,000.00 Truck claim: Since defendant didn't quit, under 
paragraph 7.2 of the purchase/employment agreement plaintiff had no right to deprive 
defendant of the continued use and possession of the truck. 
Defendant's $41,415.22 Lease Obligations claim: Plaintiff assumed all of 
defendant's obligations under the lease, but failed to satisfy those lease obligations, 
including (among others) the obligation to repair significant damage (defendant's Exhibit 
235) to the leased premises. 
Plaintiff has formally by affidavit taken the position (R. 1034 at para. 4) during 
this litigation that that "[Plaintiff] agreed to and did in fact assume all of [defendant's] 
obligations under his lease with the landlord". 
Defendant testified (R. 3350 at p. 1928, line 24 through p. 1937, line 11) that as a 
result of plaintiff s failure to fulfill these assumed lease obligations, defendant has 
suffered significant economic loss. Since defendant was unable to afford the repair costs 
(estimated in the civil suit (defendant's Exhibit 234) filed against defendant by the 
landlord to be approximately $75,000.00), defendant continued to rent the wall panel 
plant through October 31, 2002, until he was finally able to reach a compromise with the 
landlord. Pursuant to such compromise, the favorable lease was terminated fourteen 
month early and defendant contributed approximately 80 hours of labor (valued by 
defendant at $30.00 per hour for a total of $2,400.00) to repair and clean up and 
approximately $700.00 of sheet metal materials for repair of the panel plant walls. 
In addition to the $2,400.00 of labor and the $700.00 of sheet metal materials, 
defendant incurred rent payments of $20,463.48 ($1,705.29 per month for 12 months) 
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and the 2001 real estate tax escalation of $1,191.74. During this 12-month period 
defendant gained no benefit from the availability of the leased premises, since plaintiff 
had improperly deprived him of his truck, his equipment, his final pay, and had diverted 
his time and financial resources to improperly prevent him from effectively competing 
with plaintiff in the wall panel business. 
At the time plaintiff took over the lease defendant also had $16,660.00 remaining 
of unamortized consideration which he had paid when he assumed the lease on 
September 22, 1999. See defendant's Exhibits 183 (unreceived) (G07561) and 103. 
Defendant's $573,343.27 Attorney's Fee claim: Defendant has properly pled and 
proved his claim for attorney's fees. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 
1982). 
In his Counterclaim (R. 201) defendant has pled in his prayer for (among others) 
"an award of costs [and] attorney's fees". In his Fourteenth Defense (R. 702) defendant 
has also pled "to recover all costs and attorneys' fees incurred by [him] in the defense of 
the Amended Complaint". 
Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $3,500 (defendant's Exhibit 236) and $2,500 
(defendant's Exhibit 237) in defending the suit by the landlord and the criminal complaint, 
respectively. Under Utah law, attorney's fees are recoverable as consequential damages 
where (as here) "[the breaching party's] breach of contract foreseeably caused the [non-
breaching party] to incur attorney fees through litigation with a third party". Collier v. 
Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah 1992). 
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To date defendant has also incurred attorney's fees and costs in defending and 
prosecuting this case, including attorney's fees of $4,205 (defendant's Exhibit 236) to prior 
counsel; costs to date of $16,453.32 (defendant's Exhibit 238); and attorney's fees of 
$1,000.00 plus a 40% contingent fee (defendant's Exhibits 238 and 239) to current counsel. 
Under Utah law the attorney's fees in this case are also recoverable by defendant as 
consequential damages: 
The rationale for allowing attorney fees as recoverable damages within the 
contemplation of the parties in first-party insurance claims is also applicable to 
employment claims. Terminated employees, like injured insurance claimants, 
find themselves in a particularly vulnerable position once the employer breaches 
the employment agreement. Employers can reasonably foresee that wrongfully 
terminated employees will be forced to file suit to enforce their employment 
contracts and will foreseeably incur attorney fees. Under our holdings in 
Berube and Beck, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
the availability of consequential damages, including attorney fees, in [the 
terminated employee5si employment suit 
Helsopv. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992). (emphasis added). 
Under Utah law, damages available for a breach of contract may include not only 
general contract damages, but because the goal is to "place the aggrieved party in 
the same economic position he would have had if the contract had been 
performed," the party may also seek redress through consequential damages 
"To recover consequential damages, a non-breaching party must prove (1) that 
consequential damages were caused by the contract breach; (2) that consequential 
damages ought to be allowed because they were foreseeable at the time the parties 
contracted; and (3) the amount of consequential damages within a reasonable 
certainty." 
Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, 200 (Utah App. 2003). (citations omitted). 
In this case plaintiff intentionally and purposefully terminated defendant's 
employment to trigger the paragraph 7.4 forfeiture provision of the purchase/employment 
agreement. In conjunction with such termination plaintiff also prevented defendant from 
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effectively competing with plaintiff after employment termination by depriving defendant 
of his truck, his equipment, his facility, and funds to pursue a competing wall panel 
business. In support of such deprivation plaintiff intentionally and purposefully sapped 
defendant of time and resources by filing the civil suit, causing a criminal action to be 
filed, abandoning the leased premises (two months after defendant's termination) in a 
state of disrepair, and withholding payments to defendant relating to various Hamlet 
Homes jobs, the third quarter bonus, and final paycheck. 
Such breach of contract and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing give rise to damages, including consequential damages in the form of attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Additionally, reasonable attorney's fees and costs are also available to defendant, 
since plaintiffs claims and defenses are without merit4. Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 793 
(Utah 2002). 
Defendant's $16,756.64 Costs claim: Following the Utah Supreme Court's Heslop 
rationale, costs are similarly available as foreseeable consequential damages where, as 
here, plaintiff has wrongfully terminated defendant. 
4
 Arguably under Utah law the "bad faith" element of 78-27-56(1) "drops out" (see 
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, (Utah 2000)) where, as here, 
the terminated employee finds himself "in a particularly vulnerable position once the 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in favor of 
plaintiff on plaintiffs first (conversion), second (unjust enrichment), fifth (breach of 
written contract), sixth (breach of oral contract), and seventh (breach of fiduciary duties) 
causes of action relating to the Hamlet Homes check claim (of $7,293.00 less defendant's 
last paycheck of $1,451.43 for a net of $5,841.57), the generator rental claim (of 
$2,148.00), and the conversion of plaintiff s personal property claim (of $7,517.59) and 
related interest. Defendant also seeks reversal of the award to plaintiff of punitive 
damages (of $34,000.00), attorney's fees (of $164,461.25 and related interest), and costs 
(of $5,892.52). 
Based on the foregoing, defendant also seeks judgment against plaintiff on 
defendant's first (breach of contract), fourth (waste of premises), fifth (conversion of 
personal property), seventh (trespass to personal property), eighth (declaratory judgment), 
ninth (breach of contract), tenth (violation of duty of good faith and fair dealing), and 
eleventh (constructive trust) causes of action relating (through April 20, 2005) to 
defendant's final paycheck (of $1,749.56), accrued bonus (of $9,619.57), premium 
compensation (of $255,260.27), 50% of pretax profits (of $441,399.41), Hamlet Homes 
jobs (of $15,209.71) conversion of equipment (of $16,842.00), conversion of the truck 
(of $40,000.00), wall panel plant lease obligations (of $41,415.22), attorney's fees (of 
$573,343.27) costs (of $16,756.64) and related interest. 
employer breaches the employment agreement". Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 




Dated this ~f '— day fif September, 2007. 
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